Pre-legislative scrutiny of the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Draft Bill

Q54 Chair (Diana Johnson, Labour): Could we start off with whether you think the purpose of the draft Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill is clear? Do you think there is clarity about what this Bill is intending to do?

Jonathan Hall [Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation]: No, I don’t think there is clarity. The public might think … that the real purpose of this sort of Bill is to prevent terror attacks. On analysis, I think this Bill … is really about dealing with the aftermath of attacks …

If, on the one hand, it is about prevention, I think it is necessary to be clear with the public about what this sort of legislation might be requiring. It does seem to me that one is looking at security arches, hard perimeters, bag searches, extra staff and so on, because I absolutely accept that that sort of thing could deter a terrorist from attacking. If, on the other hand, it is really looking at dealing with the aftermath of attacks, it is more about teaching people to lock the door going in and going out, and knowing how to contact the emergency services. The former is a dramatic change to our way of life; that takes one into the sort of Israeli experience, where you might have security arches in a range of public areas. If it is the latter, it is not quite so impactful.

Q55 Chair: I think you tweeted out that you thought that this Bill could be “the most impactful terrorism legislation ever proposed”. …

Jonathan Hall: Yes. The only terrorism legislation I am aware of that puts a duty on a normal member of the public is something called section 38B of the Terrorism Act, which makes it an offence not to tell the police about an imminent attack. That is the only single section. This would have the dramatic effect of placing a duty on the hundreds of thousands of people who control premises, and that is whether you are talking about a duty to prevent attacks or a duty to manage the aftermath of attacks, so it is incredibly impactful.

The other point to note … is that, generally speaking, after attacks Government Ministers and the police, quite rightly, go on television and say, “Terrorists are not going to win. This
is not going to change the way in which we live our lives.” This Bill seems to be completely the reverse: it is actually mandating a change to the way in which we live our lives, and I am not quite sure why this change is now being mandated and is now being required. …

So, if the Bill goes through in its present form, you are not simply talking about security professionals advising the Manchester Arena; you are talking about people in squash clubs and mosques and so on having to think all the time about the terrorist risk. It is not stupid to think about the risk of over-compliance. … Imagine if you have a favourite entrance to your squash club—there is a side entrance you like to go into. Someone will say, “No, we can’t do that now—terrorism.” It could be a little bit like the data protection over-compliance that we saw about five or 10 years ago. You are not going to have mature, proportionate, trained specialists, like the police, who know how to manage these things.

By the way, in an area that is often quite political and sensitive, and religious and racially sensitive, this Bill is inviting all sorts of members of the public to become counter-terrorism specialists. One of the little lurking queries I had in mind—again, I just put it in front of you—is that if there is an attack and it is by someone from a particular ethnicity, when you charge members of the public to become like counter-terrorism officers or to have a counter-terrorism posture, there is a risk that people are going to start saying, “Well, I’m not going to have someone with that ethnicity coming in,” or, “I’m going to do extra searches for people who look like they come from that sort of background.” … once you throw out a counter-terrorism duty to hundreds of thousands of citizens, the risks of unintended consequences are quite high. …

Q57 Chair: … looking back at terrorist attacks over recent years, if this Bill was enacted, what would the effect have been on those terrorist attacks?

Jonathan Hall: I looked at Wikipedia’s list of terrorist attacks since the 1990s … Most attacks in the 1990s are outside the scope of the Bill. They are not near or in the immediate vicinity of premises; they are on Crown property, which I think is exempt, or at transport stations. It is impossible to conclude that any difference would have been made by the Bill. In the 2000s, there were six terrorist attacks—six bombings—and one vehicle attack. All but one were out of scope. … Again, it is impossible to conclude the Bill would have made a difference. …

In the 2010s, there were 14 attacks. A lot involved knives … There were also vehicle attacks, bombs and one firearm. The majority are out of scope … five …[were] potentially in scope …

Then, in the 2020s, there are five attacks. All but one are out of scope, and that leaves the murder of Sir David Amess. That was a targeted attack, and I do not think the Bill would have made a difference.

When you go through the last 30 or so years of attacks, I think it is really only Manchester Arena and the Borough Market aspect of the London Bridge attacks where the Bill potentially could have made a difference. … So it is quite a small evidence base for saying that a legal duty needs to be created. …

Q58 Chair: … I want to ask you about … premises that are less than 100, but there is a group of them. The cumulative effect of having lots of little restaurants … creates an area that people might think an attack could happen in. The Bill does not deal with that, because there is no sense of an area being a hub. It treats individual business and premises separately. Do you think that is an issue?

Jonathan Hall: The fundamental point is that there is no rational basis for cutting off the duty at premises of 100-plus if you are thinking about terrorist risk. In principle, a terrorist who is carrying out a marauding knife attack could attack in a small boutique shop, in a large premises or, as you say, in a cluster of attacks. The way in which the Bill seems to be constructed is not to say that there is any greater
risk for premises over 100, but that it is more proportionate to impose the duty on premises over 100. I agree with you that if you were looking at the risk, you would not distinguish between 100-plus and under 100, and you might include clusters of premises as well. …

Q59 Simon Fell (Conservative): … Given the list you have just rattled through, and the potential impact of this Bill on those if it had been in place at the time, it does feel a little like we are using a sledgehammer to crack a nut. …

Jonathan Hall: … I am not aware of any legislation that is equivalent to this anywhere else in the world. …

If you look at the impact assessment, there is an interesting concession at paragraph 41. It says, “In the absence of specific threat reporting regarding attack locations, capacity represents a fair and equitable basis to ensure that locations which may be significantly impacted by targeting by terrorists are included.” So the way the 100-plus figure is settled upon is on the basis not that there is any evidence that these premises are more likely to be attacked, whether in rural locations in Cumbria, or indeed in London, but that it is fair and equitable.

The point I would make is that “fair and equitable” is not the same as necessary and proportionate. Generally speaking, the strength of terrorism legislation in this country is that it advances incrementally on the basis of evidence. … This seems to be going beyond the bounds of normal terrorism legislation, in the sense that it is not responding to a need. …

Q61 Jonathan Hall: … I think the logic of the position is, “Since these attacks could come out of anywhere, then everywhere ought to be covered by a duty. Since it would be disproportionate to have every single premises … let’s cut it somewhere and make it 100-plus.” …

… terrorists are often attacking in crowded spaces in public and on the streets, and all of those places are outside scope. You have to ask yourself whether, if a Bill was created and it did have a deterrent effect, it would displace terrorist attacks from premises on to streets. I think the answer is that, in some cases, it would. …

Q64 Alison Thewliss: … In Scotland, in terms of someone who owns a bar and who has a personal licence for a premises, there seems to be some suggestion that there will be an accountable person in each premises for assessing risk and making sure that things are carried out. …

Jonathan Hall: … I do not see why in smaller premises—if they are to have any sort of duty—existing licence holders cannot absorb it, as long as it is relatively small and easy to do. … In terms of Scotland, I cannot think of any terrorist attacks within the scope of the Bill at all—of course, the Glasgow Airport attack was outside scope. …

Q72 Jonathan Hall: … I understand common-sense points—“Surely it’s a good idea. Who can object?” But, in cold, hard reality, there is no evidence base for saying that this would make a difference. …

Q73 Chair: To be clear, the Regulatory Policy Committee rated the impact assessment for the Bill as not fit for purpose. Do you agree with that assessment?

Jonathan Hall: I agree with the assessment completely because, with respect, the Regulatory Policy Committee has completely put their finger on the right point, which is, what is the evidence that this is going to create a benefit for that level of premises that begins to justify the impact on ordinary life, members of the public and the costs that will be incurred? …

Q75 Matt Jukes [Assistant Commissioner for Specialist Operations, Metropolitan Police Service]: … The context at present is one where we face a threat that is dispersed. It is principally driven by those who might act in ways that are of lower sophistication, who might use knives or vehicles as weapons and whose targets are no longer exclusively great places of state or people of state …
I know from casework … that protective security measures, and the power of a vigilant public, make a difference constantly to protecting our communities. … But that partnership is inconsistent, and I welcome the opportunity that this Bill brings to drive greater consistency in the partnership that we already enjoy with businesses and communities. …

Q76 Matt Jukes: … this Bill can make an important contribution to reporting the harm done by terrorism. It will do that in two ways. First, we know that it can serve to prevent and deter terrorists to see that there are vigilant custodians of the public space present and that there are physical measures in place. … But we also know that the harm done, particularly by the marauding terrorist attacks, can be mitigated, so preparation is important. … There is an opportunity presented by the framework created by this Bill for people to take simple low or no-cost steps that will save lives. …

Q79 Shaun Kennedy [Chief Operating Officer for Central Europe, Securitas]: The Bill needs to dictate what a “competent person” means. The very risk assessment that determines what level of security a premises should have needs to be accredited, or quite clearly defined …

Matt Jukes: … From a counter-terrorism policing perspective, we have developed thoughts on what the qualification might be for those individuals. But … It is vital that policing and wider parts of Government communicate as much as possible and as clearly as possible, free of charge, to the public so that sector-specific risk assessments and descriptions of threat can be available to the public, who will not need to turn to others for that information. There needs to be as much as possible that is generic—because many of these premises will fall into sets of groups—so that we are making this palpably as easy for those who are responsible for premises as possible …

Q80 Tim Loughton (Conservative): … there are 10,000 village halls in England. How many terrorist attacks against any of them have there been in the last 10 years? …

Q83 Matt Jukes: … I have just been in a meeting with the Jewish Community Security Trust. It might be in a rural community where there is no synagogue that a community hall or village hall is used by the Jewish community for their place of worship or for a family celebration. We know that the threat to that community is, sadly, enduring. …

Q84 Tim Loughton: … The example that you have just given is a personal organisation-based risk. If my village hall regularly hosted events by the Jewish community—which may have a large number of residents locally—additional precautions could be taken. Ultimately, I could say, on behalf of the trustees, that because of the risk involved we would not host an event by the Jewish community. Then we would have all sorts of understandable problems about whether we were discriminating. But we could certainly specify that certain risk assessments had to be undertaken by that organisation. … However, this Bill places a considerable amount of obligations and liabilities on a structure that we have no evidence has seen any evidence of terrorist activities. If there were a higher-risk group of people or organisations likely to use it, special measures could be taken and, ultimately, we could say, “We cannot cater for you here. Could you please go to this other place that can?” Isn’t that a more proportionate way of looking at this?

Matt Jukes: … we face an enduring threat, which we would recognise in terms of its motivation, from what we would call Islamist terrorism. But that is much more one that is not directed but is inspired by and drawing on propaganda from ISIS and from Daesh—lone actors, self-initiated terrorists. A growing part of our casework is concerned with extreme right-wing terrorism, and we have an—again growing—part of our work where the motivation and potential set of targets are mixed, unclear and unstable. We are dealing with people who, in mental health crisis, are searching out violent rhetoric online. Since 2017, we have disrupted 37 late-stage terrorist plots. Ten of the potential targets, I believe, would have fallen within the scope of the Bill …
What we simply want to see is that the public are consistently equipped to understand that threat and, where they have responsibility for a significant number of people, to take proportionate actions to mitigate the risk that they face. …

Q89 Tim Loughton: … And it is not just village halls. What is the requirement on places of worship as well? There are 40,000 places of worship in this country—19,500 are Church of England premises. I asked the officials from the Home Office, first, how many attacks there had been on village halls. They did not know. The answer is zero. I do not think that anybody has come up with a single one. I asked them how many attacks there have been on places of worship, and they said none. That is wrong, because we know that there have been a number of attacks on synagogues and on mosques and, potentially, on Church of England premises—I cannot think of any. However, there is a bigger case for saying that. Again, this is a big requirement. Who becomes the responsible person? Is it the vicar? Are we putting an extra responsibility on the vicar? Are people then going to stay away because they think they have suddenly become a terrorist target? I want some proportionality on this, where a lot of good sense, a lot of better awareness and better promotion of existing materials to the general public …

Matt Jukes: … we sit here today not far from the anniversary of the attack at Finsbury Park mosque. It is worth recognising that places of worship are absolutely, tragically, in the sights of terrorists. … Our communities are safer because we are involved in communal activity. We do not want to do anything that shuts that down. … It is our business to ensure that terrorism does not change the way that we live our lives, but that intent alone cannot remove the threat from the daily experience of people around the world and, tragically, the experience every year of people in the UK. …

Q100 Simon Fell: … in the draft legislation we seem to have taken the approach that it is based on numbers rather than potential targets or risks. We have heard concerns in evidence from certain groups who think that they have a higher risk of attack and are potentially more exposed than others. Do you think that the legislation is approaching this in the right way?

Matt Jukes: Notwithstanding the commentary about creating a universal duty, which is beyond the scope of this legislation and was not, in the end, attractive to those who drafted it, it is a cogent starting point. Then we need to work away at sector-specific advice and make more of that, or as much of it as we can, available … We are talking about a piece of legislation that is intended to reduce the harm caused by terrorism. If there are more people in a premises, that harm will be greater. So it is absolutely cogent to set a level where you think you could intervene, with an organisation that has the competence and where the risk is present that a significant number of people will be harmed. …

Q106 Chair: Minister, there seems to be a bit of confusion about what this Bill is about … Is it about preventing or dealing with the aftermath of terrorist attacks?

Tom Tugendhat [Minister for Security, Home Office]: This is really about prevention. This is about planning; it is about making sure that people have thought about what might happen and taking appropriate steps, depending on where they are, what size their venue is and so on, to make sure that we are as resilient as we can be as a country and as communities across it, and to make sure that we are providing as difficult a target as we can for any terrorist incident and that, should one, sadly, occur, we are ready to respond. …

Q107 Tom Tugendhat: … The whole point of this Bill is to have appropriate responses and preparations to respond to the challenges we all face.

Q108 Chair: In his evidence to us in the first session, [Jonathan Hall] also went through the list of terrorist attacks that had taken place since the 1990s, and was able to go through and highlight where this Bill would have impacted on what happened. There were only one
or two of the number that he went through where he said the legislation would have had any effect.

**Tom Tugendhat**: I hear that point … and I understand it. …

One of the points that we should also be considering is that, when we look at terrorist incidents … we very often do not look … at the buildings nearby, at the response of people nearby and at where things did not happen.

For example, if you look at Borough Market, there was a very quick response from some people to close doors, lock doors and get people out through safe exits and safe routes, and staff who were brilliant. Others, for various reasons, did not have that opportunity. …

That is why this preparedness may, in some ways, not always be noticed—in fact, in the best circumstances, it will not be—because the circumstances in which it is put in place lead to events not happening, injuries not occurring and newspaper reports not being written …

**Q111 Tom Tugendhat**: … What we are looking at here is not terrorist legislation. We are looking at planning and preparedness for a potential terrorist incident, and that is a slightly different area. …

Let me touch on why I think this is proportionate. …

First … we simply do not know where the next incident might happen. There was a time—there really was a time—when we had what used to be known as spectaculars, which were orchestrated by the IRA—for example, in Bishopsgate—and by al-Qaeda, ISIS and so on. Those events were orchestrated to target venues that you thought you knew. They were the sort of incidents that were designed to change Government policy in a very radical way by killing, sometimes, hundreds of people.

What we are seeing today, due to the brilliance of our intelligence professionals and some amazing co-operation with partners, is that that ability to orchestrate is hugely diminished … That means that what we are seeing is individual actors trying to exploit targets of opportunity. …

Very sadly, we are also often dealing with individuals who have mental health issues and are not always thinking as rationally as you might. You may say, for example, “Why would a church be targeted—to your earlier point—rather than a Jewish group?” Well, you could have asked the same question in the north of France only a few years ago, when a priest was murdered in his church by a very troubled individual, who had inspired himself to radicalism online …

**Q112 Tim Loughton**: … From what you have just described, individuals who do not have a rational approach will just as easily decide to target a private house and kill the residents. Where we can make provision that is proportionate, it surely is based on two things. One is the density of those attending …

Secondly, terrorism is targeted not at premises but at a higher-risk individual, be it our former parliamentary colleagues, a synagogue or a mosque, or a group of people who may or may not be in a building. …

**Tom Tugendhat**: … I think what we have set forward is a proportionate response. …

First, the standard tier only applies in a building of over 100 people. This is designed to align with the HSE, the Health and Safety Executive … These are categories that people already understand. …

The second point is that, when we talk about proportionality, the standard tier requires venues to use a Government website, ProtectUK, which incurs no cost except time—I accept that time is limited for all of us, but there is no outlay of payments and the cost is entirely in time. It requires the application of a thought process and reasonableness, but it does not require any outside expertise. It should not require any extra cost. It certainly does not demand security requirements such as search tools, metal detectors or anything like that. …
The enhanced tier ... requires the application of the types of measures that already apply in many cases. ... it is really a requirement to do what many people are already doing. ...

Q116 Tim Loughton: ... You have indicated that this is all for free, but it is not, is it? Because there is that notional cost, which will be a real cost for those premises that will now be covered, which your own assessment estimates. Secondly, there is a responsible person liability requirement on somebody who will have to step forward and who can take on liabilities. Thirdly, there may be an insurance element now impacting the insurance premium to cover those premises. Fourthly, we do not know, because of a lack of detail about what goes with this Bill, but it may lead to the regulator requiring adaptations to be made to certain establishments, which then becomes rather costly. ...

Tom Tugendhat: ... we already require churches to have somebody responsible for safeguarding. We already have somebody responsible for health and safety work. ...

Q117 Tim Loughton: ... there is a safeguarding requirement for people who work within the church because of a number of very high-profile cases where children have been abused by people working in the church. ... There are no instances of any terrorist attacks against village halls ...

Tom Tugendhat: Forgive me, but I believe David Amess was murdered in a village hall.

Q119 Tim Loughton: Those premises might not have been covered by your legislation, so it is irrelevant, isn’t it? ...

Q120 Tim Loughton: ... You are trying to use historic events to justify your legislation. I am questioning whether those historic events are relevant to the legislation, and I don’t think that they are. ...

Q126 Tim Loughton: .... Who is liable who has the responsibility for the village hall, if they do not undertake these new regulations? Who gets prosecuted for not complying with the legislation?

Shaun Hipgrave [Director, Homeland Security Group, Home Office]: ... There is a long way to go before anyone is going to be fined in the standard tier. There will be advice orders and compulsory orders—

Q127 Tim Loughton: Issued against whom?

Shaun Hipgrave: Against the organisation.

Q128 Tim Loughton: A village hall is typically a charity, run by voluntary trustees with a chair of the trustees—me, for example—and I am likely to be nominated to be the responsible person. So I am the one who would suffer a penalty for not complying.

Shaun Hipgrave: In our real world, we do not expect that you or the trustees would be absolutely refusing to support the guidance.

Q129 Tim Loughton: Why not? I cannot afford to do it. We live on a shoestring. We might have to close our village hall. ...

Q131 Tim Loughton: ... The point is that somebody can be prosecuted at the end of it if they do not go along with this because they cannot or will not for whatever reason. ...

Q140 Tim Loughton: In all venues it includes training, does it not?

Tom Tugendhat: No.

Q141 Tim Loughton: In the village hall, there will be no training required?

Q143 Tom Tugendhat: No, unless the venue was over 800 people.

Shaun Hipgrave: There is free training on the ACT app.

Tom Tugendhat: Are you talking about reading an app as training?

Q144 Tim Loughton: No. I am running a village hall, which has capacity for 101 people. Under this legislation, what will I now be required to do?

Tom Tugendhat: You will be required to think about your venue, to think about whether doors should be locked or opened, depending on what it is, and about how to evacuate
people, how to secure people and then—

Tim Loughton: I am confident about that; done that.

Tom Tugendhat: Right. And then to prepare your team—

Q145 Tim Loughton: Have I now complied?

Tom Tugendhat: If you have prepared your team; if you have spoken to your team about it.

Q146 Tim Loughton: Prepared my team? What does that mean?

Tom Tugendhat: This is not some sort of first aid training. I think maybe you and I have different ideas of training.

Q147 Tim Loughton: What is it?

Tom Tugendhat: Discussing it; making sure that your team is aware of it.

Q148 Tim Loughton: So we’ve had a nice chat over a cup of tea for five minutes—"What do you think about anti-terrorist training? Oh, it’s okay; we’ve got quite a strong door there. We are fine." Would that comply? …

Q149 Tim Loughton: … You have just told us that no training is required. Clearly, training is required. Your own officials have told us. The legislation suggests training. You are redefining training.

Tom Tugendhat: I think training does require some form of action, having spent 15 years doing quite a lot of training. I don’t see drawing up a plan as training. …

Q150 Shaun Hipgrave: There is an e-learning app that people can go on for an hour and learn about what is required for a standard-tier evaluation.

Q151 Chair: … There is training, then? …

Q169 Chair: It may be helpful to refer to paragraph 14 of the explanatory notes on the Bill, which set out clearly that, under the standard tier, there will be a requirement for terrorism protection training. …

Tom Tugendhat: … there may be a different understanding of what is meant by training. My view is training requires some sort of hands-on action like first aid training or something like this. This is e-learning. This is somebody sitting in front of a computer.

Q170 Chair: It says: “They will be required to ensure that relevant workers are given appropriate terrorism protection training.” That is what it says in your explanatory notes.

Q171 Chair: Look, Minister, I don’t think there is any purpose in us having this back and forth. Your explanatory notes clearly set out that training is required.

Tom Tugendhat: … My point is that, in many of the village halls that Mr Loughton is referring to, there are no workers. It is run by an individual or a very small group; there are no workers.

Q177 Tim Loughton: … are you saying that where there is a requirement to ensure that relevant workers are given appropriate terrorism protection training under section 14 of the guidance, that is a paid worker? So where volunteers are running a village hall—if it is entirely run by volunteers—no training will be required?

Tom Tugendhat: No, it is relevant workers.

Q178 Tim Loughton: What is a relevant worker?

Tom Tugendhat: Anybody who is working there would be relevant.

Q179 Tim Loughton: Voluntary, not pecuniary?

Tom Tugendhat: It could be voluntary. We know, sadly, that terrorists do not discriminate between ownership models. What we are talking about here is people who are working. As you and I both know, Mr Loughton, there are many village halls where there is nobody working. The village hall is owned by an entity, a charity, which is often run by two or three people. It may be a scout group or a wedding or something like that that is using the venue.
Q180 Tim Loughton: Every village hall requires to be maintained, which may be volunteers doing the cleaning, the opening up, the clearing up, or whatever. To make it clear, "workers" does not only refer to paid workers. It is the volunteers who may solely be responsible for the running of that bricks-and-mortar establishment—the village hall. …

Tom Tugendhat: Absolutely. Forgive me. If I may come back to, “in a proportionate way”, if it is somebody who is solely there for an hour to do the cleaning, it would not be proportionate. …

Q181 Tim Loughton: How do we define that? So one of the trustees who comes in on a rota to do an hour’s cleaning a month would not be covered, but if it was an hour’s cleaning in a week, would that be covered? Or an hour’s cleaning a day? How?

Tom Tugendhat: … I am not going to go into the details of it. …

Q182 Tim Loughton: We do not have any details; that is the problem, isn’t it? You are trying to claim that my volunteers running my parish hall would not be required to have any training. Then you said, “Well, actually, they would, but it is only some online stuff.” They will require training within the terms of this Bill, according to your explanatory notes. …

Tom Tugendhat: … It would be similar to fire marshal training, or the sort of training that people conduct in areas such as that—heath and safety training—where it is not appropriate for everybody who may be working in the venue. It will be appropriate as it is appropriate, and that is why the legislation is set out to explain proportionality. That is why what we are looking to do is to have a regulator who works as a partner through this process, and the individuals concerned use the app through this process to ensure that they have an appropriate level.

Q183 Chair: Might it help us all if we could have a note after this session clearly setting out what is required in the law, what your explanatory notes are actually saying, and what the definition of “worker” and “volunteer” is? If you could deal with all that in a note, that might be a better way of addressing this.

Tom Tugendhat: Very happy to. …

To read the full transcript see
https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/13353/html/

Other Relevant Information

Antisemitism Policy Trust

Glossary of Antisemitic Terms

Relevant Legislation  ** new or updated today

UK Parliament

Bill of Rights Bill
https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3227
Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill
https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3475

Education (Non-religious Philosophical Convictions) Bill
https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3186

** Holocaust Memorial Bill
https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3421

House of Commons Library Briefing

Marriage Act 1949 (Amendment) Bill
https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3325

** Online Safety Bill
https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3137

Bill as amended in Committee
https://bills.parliament.uk/publications/51870/documents/3679

Nakba Commemoration Bill
https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3461

Palestine Statehood (Recognition) Bill
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Private Burial Grounds and Cemeteries Bill
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Same Sex Marriage (Church of England)
https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3438

Schools Bill
https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3156

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Draft Bill

Universal Credit (Removal of Two Child Limit) Bill
https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3163

Universal Jurisdiction (Extension)
https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3454
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